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ABSTRACT
This study presents a critical review of disclosed, documented, and malicious cybersecurity incidents
in the water sector to inform safeguarding efforts against cybersecurity threats. The review is pre-
sented within a technical context of industrial control system architectures, attack-defense models,
and security solutions. Fifteen incidents were selected and analyzed through a search strategy that in-
cluded a variety of public information sources ranging from federal investigation reports to scientific
papers. For each individual incident, the situation, response, remediation, and lessons learned were
compiled and described. The findings of this review indicate an increase in the frequency, diversity,
and complexity of cyberthreats to the water sector. Although the emergence of new threats, such as
ransomware or cryptojacking, was found, a recurrence of similar vulnerabilities and threats, such as
insider threats, was also evident, emphasizing the need for an adaptive, cooperative, and comprehen-
sive approach to water cyberdefense.
c© 2020
1. Introduction
The water and wastewater sector (WWS) is considered by
the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be one of
the main targets for cyberattacks among the 16 lifeline infras-
tructure sectors (White House, 2013). Safeguarding it against
cybersecurity threats is considered a matter of national priority
(White House, 2017). From 2012 to 2015, WWS received the
highest number of assessments from the Cybersecurity and In-
frastructure Security Agency Industrial Control Systems Cyber
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT, 2016b), which rou-
tinely conducts on-site cybersecurity assessments for several
critical infrastructure sectors (ICS-CERT, 2016b). The only
exception was 2014, when the number of assessments in the
energy sector was slightly higher (ICS-CERT, 2016b).
According to ICS-CERT (ICS-CERT, 2016b), 25 water util-
ities reported cybersecurity incidents in 2015, making WWS
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the third most targeted sector. Because there are over 151,000
public water systems in the United States (USEPA, 2019), one
may conclude that cybersecurity risk in WWS is low, and most
systems are secure. However, the reality is that many cyber-
security incidents either go undetected, and consequently un-
reported (Walton, 2016), or are not disclosed because doing
so may jeopardize the victims reputation, customers trust, and,
consequently, revenues (Cava, 2018; Rubin, 2019). Moreover,
the complexity and impact of cyber-originated incidents can be
as serious as the incidents initiated from the operational tech-
nology (OT) area. Most industrial sectors, and WWS in partic-
ular, now are embracing the digital age, but still lack dedicated
cybersecurity specialists to provide customized security guide-
lines, secure systems, and train employees.
Recently, cybersecurity has piqued the interest and attention
of the WWS industry and policy-making entities. Several ed-
ucational programs have been offered by the USEPA, DHS,
the American Water Works Association, and the Water Infor-
mation Sharing and Analysis Center over the last few years
to raise awareness, train staff, and provide resources and tools
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to assist with cybersecurity practices (WaterISAC; ICS-CERT;
USEPA, b). This has been accompanied by a rising interest in
the research community (Amin et al., 2013; Rasekh et al., 2016;
Ahmed et al., 2017; Formby et al., 2017; Taormina et al., 2017;
Laszka et al., 2017; Taormina et al., 2018; Chandy et al., 2019;
Taormina and Galelli, 2018; Housh and Ohar, 2018; Ramot-
soela et al., 2019). In this respect, valuable lessons and insights
may exist in past cybersecurity incidents that should be discov-
ered and disseminated to inform the ongoing cyberdefense in-
vestments and efforts, thereby enhancing their relevance and
effectiveness. This requires a comprehensive compilation and
review of the these incidents, a public resource that is not cur-
rently available.
This study, conducted by the Environmental and Water Re-
sources Institute (EWRI) Task Committee on Cyberphysical
Security of Water Distribution Systems, presents a review of
disclosed, documented, and malicious cybersecurity incidents
in WWS to inform safeguarding efforts against cybersecurity
threats. First, a review of a typical industrial control system
(ICS) architecture, standard models, and common practices,
alongside security controls and solutions offered for these en-
vironments, is provided. This is followed by a description of
attack-defense models, which are an important concept in the
design of cybersecurity systems. Next, a selection of cyber inci-
dents in WWS is presented. The main details regarding the sit-
uation, response, remediation, and lessons learned are reported
for each incident. This review concludes with recommenda-
tions for industry, policy makers, and research community.
2. Industrial control networks
In order to provide context for the analysis of the incidents,
this section reviews traditional OT networks, their integration
with Information Technology (IT) networks, and standard ar-
chitecture designs proposed for ICS networks. We will refer to
these architectures when reviewing some of the incidents and
map the attacker’s activities to the architectural layers and tar-
geted hardware/software.
ICS networks traditionally uses a system of hardware and
software components—called Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA)—for process control, data collection,
system monitoring, communication with industrial devices, and
log data storing. A typical SCADA system architecture is de-
picted in Figure 1a: the lowest level generally consists of field
elements (also called end or dumb devices), such as sensors,
pumps, and actuators. These elements are operated by control
devices, such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) and
Remote Terminal Units (RTU). PLCs and RTUs are microcom-
puters that send control signals to the field elements, acquire
data, and transmit them to the central control station, such as a
Master Terminal Unit (MTU). MTU and RTUs/PLCs commu-
nicate and function in a master/slave model (through wired or
wireless networks, public telephone network, or even through
the internet) to send commands, upload new configurations, and
monitor the field elements. Operators manage all these opera-
tions through a Human Machine Interface (HMI) connected to
the MTU that allows them to gather data, send commands to re-
mote sites, and change settings and configurations (Krutz, 2005;
International Society of Automation, 2009).
Figure 1b shows a typical water system architecture with
RTUs and PLCs geographically-dispersed in different sites. We
have mapped different layers of a SCADA architecture to this
sample network, where field elements, such as valves or pres-
sure gauges, are monitored by RTUs with wireless antennas.
The SCADA servers are located in a central control station (e.g.,
the headquarters of a water utility) and remotely communicate
with the RTUs and PLCS scattered in the entire service area
(SWAN Forum Interoperability Workgroup, 2016).
For many years, SCADA systems, and, in general, OT net-
works in industrial environments, were air-gapped—that is, not
connected to corporate IT networks or internet. However, as
technology advanced, many organizations planned to consoli-
date overlapping IT and OT networks. This approach aims at
saving maintenance costs and integrating data collection and
analysis (Krutz, 2005). However, such integration comes at
high security risks due to the following reasons: 1) OT networks
have different operational priorities compared to IT networks—
e.g., availability vs. confidentiality—and one model may not
fit both; 2) Most ICS devices and protocols are not designed
to support security features like data encryption or access con-
trol, and often support remote access through radio modems;
3) Expensive legacy devices in ICS environments provide lim-
ited visualization options to implement and evaluate security
modifications; and, 4) Critical and real-time business opera-
tions in OT, along with safety regulations, prevent immediate
implementation of remediation options that may require system
interruptions. In light of the above, security experts have pro-
posed some work-around options to limit the access of users to
the OT network. Other efforts in the ICS security field are con-
stantly improving standards, protocols, and devices to support
security features.
The new generation of converged IT-OT networks in indus-
trial control systems, also referred to as Industrial Internet of
Things (IIoT), is no longer air-gapped. Figure 1c depicts a typ-
ical integrated ICS network consisting of multiple levels and
zones, also known as the Industrial Automation and Control
Systems (IACS) Security standard (ISA-62443) (Krutz, 2005).
A zone is in fact a set of assets (IT or OT devices) grouped
together to provide a subclass of services and applications for
the entire ICS network. The main zones can be described as
follows:
• Enterprise Zone that includes assets for business logis-
tics and enterprise systems, representing Level 4 and 5,
respectively. This zone is also known as IT network.
• Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates IT and OT net-
works, thus preventing direct access to OT devices from
the IT network. All corporateaccessible services (e.g.,
web, email) reside in this zone.
• Manufacturing Zone and Control Zone. The former
refers to the entire OT domain, including Levels 0, 1, 2,
and 3; the latter refers to Levels 0, 1, and 2, so it is equiva-
lent to the traditional ICS architecture shown in Figure 1a.
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Fig. 1: (a) Traditional ICS architecture; (b) typical architecture in water systems; and (c) ISA-62443 zoned architecture.
Level 3 provides site-level operation and asset manage-
ment. Plant historian, production scheduling and report-
ing, patch and file services reside at Level 3 (Hassanzadeh
et al., 2015).
3. Attack and Defense Models
The incidents reviewed in this paper can be comprehended
more effectively with some knowledge of attack and defense
models, which are introduced next.
3.1. Attack models
From the attacker’s perspective, a systematic process consist-
ing of several steps or individual malicious activities is required
to obtain the desired effect on the victim’s network. Lockheed
Martin researchers have expanded the kill chain concept used
in military applications to define the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC)
(Hutchins et al., 2011), which models the life cycle of an at-
tack based on the fact that the adversary uses a series of mali-
cious activities (also called intrusions or single-step attack) and
adjusts each step based on the success or failure of the previ-
ous step. CKC steps are defined as reconnaissance, weaponiza-
tion, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control
(C2), and actions on objectives. Inspired by the CKC model,
researchers have proposed several attack life cycle models that
are reviewed and discussed in Hassanzadeh and Burkett (2018).
In industrial environments, the attack life cycle is slightly
different because of the different architecture design shown in
Figure 1c. The target in such networks can be an asset in one
of the three domains, namely, IT, DMZ, or OT. However, in
most reported ICS incidents, the target is an OT asset (Has-
sanzadeh et al., 2015), since the attacker gains access to the
victim’s environment through the IT domain and then traverse
to the OT infrastructure by launching multiple attacks. This
model is defined as the ICS Kill Chain, a multi-domain, multi-
step approach that considers ISA-62443 architectural levels and
CKC steps together. Since the attacker may need to repeat sev-
eral CKC steps at each IT/OT level to laterally move within the
network from one asset to another (until he/she reaches the tar-
get), Hassanzadeh and Burkett (2018) proposed a spiral attack
model to accurately describe the attacker’s activities within the
converged IT/OT systems. Figure 2a shows a simplified version
of this model, which is color-coded to map it to the IT/DMZ/OT
domains of Figure 1c. As depicted, an attacker may start with
some reconnaissance activities in outer layers of an organiza-
tion that are more exposed to the public (e.g., web server, mail
server), and then find a vulnerable host that can be exploited.
Once the first attack is delivered and executed, the attacker is
already inside the victim’s network, and then escalates his/her
privileges and move laterally within the network towards the fi-
nal target, which is placed in the lower levels. Note that this is a
generic model, so there might be attacks that do not necessarily
start from Level 5—such as an insider that uses OT worksta-
tions or a vulnerable server in the DMZ to launch an attack.
In light of the fact that an attacker operates in a chain of
events (i.e., a set of single-step intrusions), the diamond model
of intrusion analysis proposes a formal method called “activity
thread” (Caltagirone et al., 2013). The method shows not only
the attacker’s steps and causal relation between them, but also
3
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Fig. 2: (a) Spiral attack model in converged IT/OT networks; and (b) diamond model of intrusion analysis, with the core features at the corners, and metafeatures
and expanded metafeatures inside the diamond.
a complete list of features for each of these steps. Figure 2b
shows the core and meta features of each single-step intrusion,
or event. An activity thread in an industrial environment is a
directed graph (like the spiral set of arches in Figure 2a), where
each vertex is an event/intrusion (see Figure 2b) and links rep-
resent the relation between those intrusions from the first step
of the attack to the final target. As shown in Figure 2b, the four
core features describe how an adversary deploys a capability
over some infrastructure against a victim. Let us further focus
on these features:
• Adversary is the actor or organization responsible for the
attack. The adversary can be categorized as insider or out-
sider and individual, group, or organization. This is usu-
ally an unknown feature in most cyber-attacks. It is impor-
tant to understand the distinction between adversary oper-
ator (i.e., the actual hacker) and adversary customer (i.e.,
the entity that benefits from the attack).
• Capability is the set of tools and techniques that are used
by the attacker. The vulnerabilities and configuration is-
sues in the target environment define the capability of an
attacker.
• Infrastructure is the physical and/or logical communica-
tion structure, such as email addresses or USB devices,
used by the attacker to deliver the attack capabilities, main-
tain control over them, and finally obtain results. The in-
frastructure can be owned or controlled by the attacker or
an intermediary (e.g., zombies hosts, botnets, or compro-
mised email accounts).
• Victim is the target that has vulnerabilities and configura-
tion issues to provide attack capabilities for the adversary.
Victims are either persona (e.g., people or organizations)
or assets (e.g., networks, systems, accounts, or informa-
tion).
In addition to the core features, there exist six meta-features
in every security event: 1) timestamp, that is, the start and stop
time of the intrusion; 2) phase, or step, describing the posi-
tion of the intrusion in the entire attack kill chain; 3) direction,
which denotes the course of an attack (for example, data ex-
filtration has a victim-to-infrastructure direction, while probing
goes from the adversary to the infrastructure); 4) result, which
indicates the status of an attack, such as success, failure, or
unknown; 5) resources, such as software, hardware, informa-
tion, knowledge, funds, etc.; and, 6) methodology, that is, the
class of the malicious activity, such as spear-phishing or denial-
of-service. Moreover, four expanded-meta features have also
been used to describe a single-step intrusion: detection method,
showing what tools or techniques were used in detecting the
malicious activity; data source to detect it; detection signature,
or rule, that was used for the detection; and, author, namely the
analyst-author of the intrusion. Several multi-step attack exam-
ples and their activity threads are presented in Caltagirone et al.
(2013).
3.2. Defense models
To secure target organizations, defenders can employ several
security tools and technologies. Moreover, they may have ac-
cess to standards, threat intelligence databases, security con-
trols, and benchmarks. Nonetheless, developing and imple-
menting a thorough security strategy is a very challenging task
that requires prioritization and rigour. The Center for Inter-
net Security (CIS) proposed a list of the most fundamental and
4
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valuable security actions called “CIS Controls” that every or-
ganization should consider CIS. These controls are categorized
as:
• Basic Controls, such as inventory and control of hard-
ware/software assets, continuous vulnerability manage-
ment, or controlled use of administrative privileges;
• Foundational Controls, such as email and web browser
protections, malware defenses, or secure configuration for
network devices like firewalls, routers, and switches;
• Organizational Controls, such as the implementation of
a security awareness and training program, incident re-
sponse and management, penetration tests, and red team
exercises.
Table 1 provides the complete list of CIS controls along with
their corresponding category. These controls are available and
offered in different security tools and solutions. They can have
various impacts depending on their goal and implementation:
1) detect the attack; 2) deny or prevent the attacker from ac-
cessing assets or information; 3) disrupt active malicious activ-
ities; 4) degrade the impact of an attack; 5) deceive the attacker;
or, 6) contain the malicious activity to a zone where damages
can be mitigated. Figure 3 shows how different security con-
trols (tools and solutions) can be used to protect an organiza-
tion against an intrusion attempt at each CKC step (Hutchins
et al., 2011; Bodeau et al., 2013; Willson, 2013). As an exam-
ple, network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS), host-
based intrusion detection systems (HIDS), or anti-virus (AV)
solutions can be used to detect exploitation activities. Similarly,
trust zones can contain malicious activities associated with mul-
tiple attack steps from delivery to action, and honeypots can de-
ceive attackers during several attack phases. AV solutions are
mostly used to detect or disrupt attacks during the delivery, ex-
ploitation, or installation phase, while data execution protection
(DEP) techniques are mostly used as a disruption mechanism.
In addition to traditional IT-based security controls, there ex-
ist several OT-specific security controls—such as data-diode
and unidirectional gateway, in-line command white listing, pas-
sive asset discovery, passive OT intrusion detection (or anomaly
detection), or patch and compliance management—that are cur-
rently used in industrial networks. A closer look at these solu-
tions shows that they also fall under the categories mentioned
above; however, they are designed to be compatible with OT
network protocols and standards. For example, unidirectional
gateway ensures a limited (if not zero) network interaction from
the IT to the OT domain that should be considered as a firewall
with a very restricted communication rule consistent with the
OT architecture and its security needs. Hence, this OT-specific
security control is a boundary defense control listed in Table
1. Similarly, passive asset discovery in OT networks is a basic
security control to create an inventory of authorized and unau-
thorized devices (first control in Table 1). A technical report
published by the Department of Energy (Department of En-
ergy) lists 21 actions that can increase the security of SCADA
networks. Each action corresponds to one or multiple security
controls listed here.
4. Incidents
In this review, a cybersecurity incident refers to an incident
that has been maliciously launched from the cyber space to
cause adverse consequences to a target entity. All available re-
ports on disclosed, documented, and malicious cybersecurity
incidents in WWS happened until the end of May 2019 were
considered, but only the incidents with detailed and verified in-
formation were then selected. The information sources include
reports published by government organizations, scientific pa-
pers, internal reports from affected utilities, and media cover-
age that reported interviews with the involved official represen-
tatives. The authors of this review did not conduct any direct
investigation themselves. The review is not restricted to any
particular geographic region. All incidents, here presented in
chronological order, are true positives, with the exception of
one incident. This was included due to the massive, negative
cry-wolf effects it created in the aftermath of its disclosure. For
each incident, we describe the situation, response/recovery (if
available), and lessons learned.
4.1. Maroochy Water Services, Australia, 2000
4.1.1. Incident
Maroochy Shire is located about 100 kilometres north of
Brisbane in the Sunshine Coast region of Queensland, Aus-
tralia. It has a population of nearly 120,000 inhabitants and
a gravity sewage collection and treatment system that processes
an average of 35 million liters of sewage each day. During the
period 1997–2000, Hunter Watertech Pty Ltd (HWT), a third-
party contractor, installed PDS Compact 500 RTUs at all 142
sewage pumping stations. This enabled to remotely control and
monitor the pumps through a SCADA system. In late January
2000, the SCADA started experiencing faults, such as loss of
communication and pump control capabilities, false alarms, or
altered configuration of the pumping stations. The incident re-
sulted in the release of nearly one million liters of raw sewage
into the river, local parks, and residential grounds. 500 meters
of open drain in a residential area were polluted.
4.1.2. Response and lessons learned
In March 2000, after monitoring and recording all signals,
the investigators concluded that the faults were caused by a hu-
man intervention. A suspect was caught on April 23rd, 2000,
having in his possession a Compact 500 computer, a two-way
radio, a laptop, a transformer, and cables. The suspect had
served as a site supervisor for Hunter Watertech until resigning
due to unspecified disagreements (with effect from December
3rd, 1999). He was sentenced to two years in jail and ordered to
pay $13,111 to the Council for the damage caused by the spill.
The sewage spill and its impacts were cleaned up. The process
took days and required the deployment of substantial resources.
The main hazard involved in this incident was the unautho-
rized access to the SCADA system, which enabled the malev-
olent actor to release raw sewage into the surrounding environ-
ment. There were no cybersecurity procedures, policies, or de-
fenses present, and the service contract was deficient or inad-
equate to handle the contractors responsibilities. Considering
that the attacker was a former supervisor of the whole project,
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Table 1: List of CIS Controls
# Security Control Category
1 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices Basic
2 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software Basic
3 Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Basic
Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
4 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation Basic
5 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges Basic
6 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs Basic
7 Email and Web Browser Protections Foundational
8 Malware Defenses (installation, spread, and execution) Foundational
9 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services Foundational
10 Data Recovery Capability (information backup process) Foundational
11 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Foundational
Routers, and Switches
12 Boundary Defense (detect, prevent, and correct unauthorized Foundational
information flow)
13 Data Protection (prevent exfiltration & ensure integrity and privacy) Foundational
14 Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know Foundational
15 Wireless Access Control (track, control, prevent, and correct Foundational
wireless accesses)
16 Account Monitoring and Control Foundational
17 Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps Organizational
18 Application Software Security Organizational
19 Incident Response and Management Organizational
20 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises Organizational
which controlled all pumping stations, the scale of the impacts
could have been more extensive. The attacker was indeed a
skillful, insider adversary with an intimate knowledge of the
target system. The adoption of the NIST SP 800-53 control
protocols Bodeau and Graubart (2013) would have arguably
prevented all of the attacker’s malicious activities. A former
employee’s access to the network, for example, should indeed
be terminated immediately. [The sources used herein for this
incident included District Court at Maroochydore, Abrams and
Weiss (2008), and Sayfayn and Madnick (2017).]
4.2. Pennsylvania Water Filtering Plant, U.S., 2006
4.2.1. Incident
FBI suspected a security breach at a water treatment facil-
ity in Harrisburg, PA, in 2006. More specifically, it appeared
that hackers planted a computer virus on the laptop computer
of an employee. The hackers then used the infected laptop as
an entry point, and installed a malicious software on the plants
computer system. The hackers were reportedly operating out-
side the US. The investigations further reported that the hackers
did not appear to target the actual plant, but merely intended to
use the computer to distribute emails and other information. It
was reported that the attack could have nevertheless affected
the normal operations of the plant. For example, it could have
altered the concentration levels of disinfectants in the potable
water.
4.2.2. Response and lessons learned
The water utility eliminated remote access to the plant and
changed all passwords. In the case of this specific attack, it
should be noted that the entry point to the plants computer sys-
tem was an employees laptop. Such weak links should always
be avoided in the security chain. Due to the distributed nature
of water infrastructure, staff often resorts to remote access to
connect to key components and check system variables, such as
tank water levels. Separating SCADA systems from administra-
tive networks, which are connected to the internet, can decrease
the risk of adversary penetrations. [The sources used herein for
this incident included McMillan (2006), USEPA (a), McGurk
(2008), and RISI.]
4.3. Tehama-Colusa Canal, U.S., 2007
4.3.1. Incident
The Tehama-Colusa Canal Authority (TCAA) consists of 17
water contractors of the Central Valley Project. Its service area
spans across the west side of the Sacramento Valley. TCAA op-
erated two canals in 2007—the Tehama Colusa Canal and the
Corning Canal—that provide water for irrigation to a variety of
permanent and annual crops in the local farms. Both canals are
owned by the federal government. In 2007, a former electrical
supervisor at the TCCA was alleged to have accessed and dam-
aged the computer used to divert water from the Sacramento
River to the local farms. Fortunately, the canals could still be
operated manually. In his role with TCCA, the employee was
responsible for the computer systems.
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Fig. 3: Matrix of defensible actions at each step of an attack.
4.3.2. Response and lessons learned
The employee accessed the computer system around August
15th, 2007, and installed unauthorized software on the SCADA
system. He was an electrical supervisor with the authority and
responsible for computer systems. The intrusion costed the
TCAA more than $5,000 in damages. The employee was even-
tually charged with unauthorized software installation and com-
puter damage to divert water from the Sacramento River and
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a fine.
This incident is another case of insider attack. In this case,
however, the insider was reportedly still an active employee
of the affected entity at the time of the attack. [The sources
used herein for this incident included McMillan (2007), Weiss
(2010), and RISI.]
4.4. Illinois Water Plant Pump Station, U.S., 2011 (a false
alarm incident)
4.4.1. Incident
In 2011, a pump burnout at an Illinois water plant was re-
ported to be the result of a cyber-attack. News of the suspected
attack became public after a security expert obtained a report
collected by the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence
Center. According to the report, a plants employee noticed
problems in the SCADA. In particular, the pump kept turning
on and off and eventually burnt out. The suspicions were raised
in part due to the apparent connections to foreign IP addresses
in the log files. This news was circulated rapidly by several
credible news agencies.
4.4.2. Response and lessons learned
The FBI and DHS launched an investigation. DHS
spokesman subsequently advised that At this time there is no
credible corroborated data that indicates a risk to critical infras-
tructure entities or a threat to public safety. According to the
DHS, the pump had malfunctioned multiple times during the
recent years. Additionally, the contractor with remote access to
the computer system was on a personal trip in Russia. Investi-
gation of the log files and interviews with the personnel collec-
tively concluded that the reported attack was a false alarm.
Interestingly, this false alarm was circulated extensively by
some credible news agencies, such as the Washington Post,
causing anxiety and cry-wolf effects. The issue could have been
prevented through a more timely consideration of the employ-
ees international travel and pump malfunctioning history. An-
other factor that likely contributed to the cry-wolf effect was
the public availability of a preliminary report that anticipated
the official conclusion of the investigations. [The sources used
herein for this incident included Nakashima (2011) , Zetter
(2011) , and Parish (2011).]
4.5. Key Largo Wastewater Treatment District, U.S., 2012
4.5.1. Incident
In 2012, the former Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Floridas
Key Largo Wastewater Treatment District illegally accessed the
districts computer system to download emails and other per-
sonal documents. He performed these actions using the cre-
dentials of other employees, after the district did not renew his
contract. He was arrested on account of felony charges, in-
cluding computer crime with intent to defraud, modify informa-
tion without authority, and delete information from the districts
computer system.
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4.5.2. Response and lessons learned
The facilitys IT manager discovered emails addressed to the
CFOs personal email account during a routine check of the
email system. These emails were sent when the CFO was still
working at the facility but already informed that his contract
was not going to be renewed. Upon discovery, the IT manager
informed the police, who then proceeded to arrest the CFO. The
attack was limited to the IT systems of the facility, with no other
malicious activity or disruptions for the district’s operations.
It is still not clear how the CFO got the credentials of his fel-
low employees. It is important for employees to constantly up-
date their passwords in order to reduce the risks associated with
stolen credentials. The CFO used these credentials to access the
system from home, suggesting that no second authentication
factor was needed to access the computer systems. Similarly
to the ‘Kemuri Water Company’ incident (Incident 8 below), a
two-factor authentication could have prevented this attack. The
attack was discovered thanks to routine checks, which should
always been performed extensively for systems containing sen-
sitive and confidential data. [The sources used herein for this
incident included Goverment Technology and WPLG Inc.]
4.6. Bowman Avenue Dam, U.S., 2013
4.6.1. Incident
The Bowman Avenue Dam is a small hydraulic infrastructure
used to control floods in Blind Brook creek (Rye, New York).
A key component of the dam is a remotely-controllable sluice
gate, in operation since 2013, that controls the water flow as a
function of water levels and temperatures in the creek. Between
August 28th and September 18th, 2013, hackers obtained unau-
thorized remote access to the SCADA system; a cyber-attack
that allowed them to gather information on water levels, tem-
perature, and the status of the sluice gate. The gate was manu-
ally disconnected for maintenance at the time of the intrusion,
so hackers could not have the opportunity of taking direct con-
trol of the sluice gate. The attack was perpetrated with the aid
of Google dorking, a computer hacking technique that lever-
ages Google search engine to locate specific stringsand thereby
vulnerabilitiesin web applications, such as the one used to mon-
itor and control the sluice gate. The hacker’s action should
not be classified as an intrusion, but rather as reconnaissance,
namely the first stage of the CKC (see Figure 2a), in which the
attacker just gathers information on a potential target by looking
for publicly available information on the Internet. The attacker
used a standalone PC of the dams system to access its control
network. However, at the time of attack, the control system
was only gathering water level information and storing it on a
spreadsheet. The control system was attached to the Internet
via a cellular modem but was directly Internet accessible and
not protected by a firewall or authentication access controls..
4.6.2. Response and lessons learned
Since the attack, a new software and a new sluice gate have
been installed. At Governor Cuomo’s direction, New York State
has taken multiple steps to improve its cybersecurity capabili-
ties across several sectors. The investigations carried out by
the DHS and Justice Department resulted in the indictment of
a few state-sponsored hackers. The attack caused over $30,000
in remediation costs. Whilst this attack had no consequences
on the security and reliability of the Bowman Avenue Dam,
it points to the vulnerabilities of critical water infrastructures,
which are often monitored and controlled through unsafe web
applications. It is thus not completely surprising to observe that
the attack happened only two months after the intallation of an
unsafe web application. [The sources used herein for this inci-
dent included Cuomo (2016), Lach (2016), and Kutner (2016).]
4.7. Five water utilities, U.S., 2014
4.7.1. Incident
In the spring of 2014, five water utilities across three states
in the U.S. experienced some problems with their smart water
meters. In particular, they faced inaccurate water bills and the
deactivation of the Tower Gateway Base Stations (TGB), which
receive signals from the water meters and transfer them to cen-
tralized facilities for monitoring and billing purposes. The
first incident was reported by Kennebec Water District (Maine),
where the utility could not connect to the TGB. Other nine at-
tacks were reported in Spotswood (New Jersey), Egg Harbor
(New Jersey), Aliquippa (Pennsylvania), and New Kensington
(Pennsylvania).
The attack was caused by a fired employee of the company
that manufactured the smart water meters—named company A
in court’s documents—who gained unauthorized access to pro-
tected computers. More specifically, the employee used to work
as a field radio frequency engineer and was fired in Novem-
ber 2013. A few weeks later, using his access to the base sta-
tion network, he conducted various malicious activities, such
as changing the root passwords, modifying the TGB radio fre-
quency, and overwriting computer scripts.
4.7.2. Response and lessons learned
This abnormality drew the attention of the Federal govern-
ment and caused investigations about possible cyber-attacks
against the water infrastructures. Since the attack disabled the
communication between utilities and their data collection net-
work, the organizations had to resume manual data gathering.
In addition, company A had to carry out forensic investigations
at its own expenses to identify the attacker, characterize the at-
tacks, and find and repair the damage.
Though the utilities suspected that the disgruntled employee
could have accessed the systems before May 2014, investiga-
tors could not link some anomalies to the attacker, since login
details were not recorded at that time. However, recorded lo-
gins showed multiple intrusions linked to the IP address of the
attackers home. The attacker was indicted for several malicious
activities, and sentenced to prison and the payment of a fine.
Even though the attacker was not a professional hacker, a de-
fault password allowed him to access the TGB. This highlights
the importance of implementing access control and revoking ac-
cess rights when someone is laid off. In addition, it is important
to log and store in a safe place all logins and users activities. If
company A had kept track of log-ins earlier, investigators could
have discovered breaches dating prior to May 2014. This would
have helped the investigations. [The sources used herein for this
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incident included Department of Justice, Cimpanu (2017), Vaas
(2017), and Gallagher (2017).]
4.8. Kemuri Water Company (a pseudonym), U.S., 2016
4.8.1. Incident
In 2016, an undisclosed water utility in the U.S. (presented
under the pseudonym of Kemuri Water Company) hired Ver-
izon Security Solutions to perform a proactive cybersecurity
assessment of its water supply and metering system. A com-
prehensive assessment was subsequently conducted on both its
OT (distribution, control, and metering) and IT (personal and
billing information of the customers) systems. The assessment
revealed several high-risk vulnerabilities, including a heavy re-
liance on outdated computers and operating systems. This in-
cluded an outdated mid-range computer system (AS400) sys-
tem that served a number of critical OT and IT functions—
including the utilitys valve and flow control application—and
had direct connections to many networks.
The detection of these vulnerabilities triggered a full re-
sponse and investigation. A cross-correlation of the utilitys
internet traffic against a repository of known threat actors dis-
closed a positive match with the IP addresses of state-sponsored
hacktivists. Interviews were also conducted with the utilitys
staff: they revealed that some staff members have been aware of
possible unauthorized access to the systems as well as a series
of unexplained valve manipulation patterns. This casts doubt on
whether the call for a forensic investigation was actually proac-
tive and not reactive.
A physical survey revealed the presence of a wired connec-
tion between the utilitys internet payment application and the
AS400 system. Since the AS400 was open to the internet, it was
concluded that access to the payment application would have
also granted access to any information stored in the AS400.
Collectively, the forensic investigations discovered an actual
exploitation of the internet-facing payment application server
and the subsequent manipulation of the utilitys valve and flow
control application. In synthesis, the incident resulted in the
exfiltration of 2.5 million unique records and manipulation of
chemicals and flow rates.
4.8.2. Response and lessons learned
Access to and from the account management web front was
terminated, and outbound connectivity of the AS400 system
was blocked immediately. Recommendations were made to re-
place the antiquated systems with more modern versions.
Multiple exploitable vulnerabilities led to the breach, which
could have led to more serious consequences if the forensic in-
vestigation was not conducted earlier or the attackers had more
knowledge of the utility’s OT and IT systems. Internet-facing
servers and applications, such the payment management ap-
plication here, should not be connected to the SCADA. The
utility had relied on a single-factor authentication; this is not
sufficient, and multi-factor authentication should be used. Out-
dated systems, like the AS400 here, which formed a single point
of failure, should not be deployed, and installation of security
patches should not be overlooked. Exfiltration of records went
unnoticed for a long time and in large amounts. There should
be a monitoring mechanism in place that oversees the transfer
of data to enable early detection and response. [The sources
used herein for this incident included Verizon (a) and Mahairas
(2018).]
4.9. An undisclosed utility, U.S., 2016
4.9.1. Incident
In 2016, the system administrator of a small water utility no-
ticed the emergence of suspicious network traffic data. In par-
ticular, the administrator found heavy network traffic originat-
ing from the control panel of a pumping station. This triggered
the possibility of a cyber-attack and a subsequent call to ICS-
CERT. An official investigation was promptly launched.
4.9.2. Response and lessons learned
The ICS-CERT was immediately provided with the data on
the network configuration. Address white-lists were instituted.
Together with a transition to non-standard ports, these actions
enabled safeguarding the network without requiring to put the
control interface in offline mode. Within a few days, ICS-CERT
also collected forensics images of the network hardware. Re-
verse engineering of the malware was subsequently performed
to determine the attacker, breach point, data compromised, and
mitigation strategy to prevent the same attack at other facilities.
No details of the key findings have been disclosed.
The situational awareness of the system administrator and
prompt notification of ICS-CERT proved to be effective in iso-
lating and thwarting a potentially catastrophic intrusion. Under
the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (CII Act),
DHS has established the Protected Critical Infrastructure Infor-
mation (PCII) Program to assure the utilities that their submit-
ted information will not be disclosed. [The source used herein
for this incident is ICS-CERT (2016a).]
4.10. An undisclosed drinking water utility, U.S., 2016
4.10.1. Incident
In late 2016, an American water authority noticed a 15,000%
increase in their monthly cellular data bills. The authority was
hacked between November 2016 and January 2017. The util-
ity had seven Sixnet BT series cellular routers, which provided
wireless access for monitoring the utilitys pumping stations as
well as a few other sites. Four of these seven routers were com-
promised by the hackers. The hack was believed to be an op-
portunistic action to steal valuable internet bandwidth, resulting
in the the authoritys cellular data bill soaring from an average
of $300 a month to $45,000 in December 2016 and $53,000 in
January 2017. However, the intrusion did not damage the util-
ity’s infrastructure and did not cause any physical harm. The
cause of the attack may stand in the Sixnet BT Series Hard-
coded Credentials Vulnerability (identified by the DHS in May
2016). A poorly-skilled hacker should indeed be able of ex-
ploiting this vulnerability by hacking a factory-installed pass-
word. Sixnet produced patches and a new firmware to mitigate
this vulnerability.
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4.10.2. Response and lessons learned
The use of hard-coded credentials by the routers manufac-
turer and failure of the water authority to install the patches
proved to be major contributors to this incident. [The sources
used herein for this incident included Walton (2017) and Jerome
(2017).]
4.11. A regional water supplier, U.K., 2017
4.11.1. Incident
A regional water supplier was notified by several of its clients
that their online account details were changed. After the clients
credential were reset, it emerged that the details of some reg-
istered bank accounts were also changed, so that refunds is-
sued to the customers were transferred fraudulently to these
new bank accounts. In particular, the diverted refunds totaled
over £500,000 and were directed to two bank accounts in Eng-
land. The banks holding these accounts were socially engi-
neered and allowed the holders to quickly transfer the major-
ity of the funds to other bank accounts in Dubai and the Ba-
hamas. Subsequently, these funds were used to purchase Bit-
coins, which were then transferred to addresses associated with
a Bitcoin mixing service, thus preventing any subject to be iden-
tified by following this trail further.
4.11.2. Response and lessons learned
The company initially notified its legal advisor about the data
breach. When the efforts to track down the bank account hold-
ers failed, the legal advisor contacted Verizon’s cybersecurity
experts, who started investigating in the company’s premises.
The experts proceeded to analyze the systems and processes in-
volved in managing the customers’ accounts. After a due dili-
gence review of logs and web server revealed that no malicious
software was present, the Verizon team suggested to interview
personnel involved with customers’ accounts. The interviews
were extended to various stakeholders, including a third-party
call center in Mumbai (India), which was responsible for ad-
ministering the online accounts and processing telephone pay-
ments. After reviewing the Customer Relationship Manage-
ment’s log files, the investigators were able to confirm that
one employee had accessed all the accounts that were fraud-
ulently refunded. In depth analysis of the employee’s comput-
ers revealed that, despite the use of a data wiping software, he
had sent numerous email messages concerning the accounts af-
fected by the fraudulent activity to another individual based in
England. When presented with this evidence, the suspected
worker finally confessed the crime and offered assistance in
identifying accounts with over £1,000 in refunds stolen. The
employee would take photographs of the account details and
send them to his aide in England, who would then create an on-
line account or request a password reset. With the help of the
call center employee, new evidence was gathered, and authori-
ties were able to secure a conviction also for the aide.
This insider attack examined here suggests that management
should also ensure that partners having access to critical data
perform stringent background checks on their employees. [The
source used herein for this incident is Verizon (b).]
4.12. A European water utility, 2018
4.12.1. Incident
A European water utility with a cloud-based OT analytics
system hired a critical infrastructure security firm, Radiflow, to
monitor its network. On January 21st, 2018, suspicious net-
work traffic was detected on the SCADA network. A series
of new links to external IP addresses created a major network
topology change, which triggered several alerts. The destina-
tion IP addresses were looked up, but this did not lead to any
malicious site. Further investigation revealed that the addresses
belonged to a MinerCircle Monero Pool. This led to the detec-
tion of crypto-mining malware in the OT network of the water
utility. The investigation classified nearly 40% of the traffic as
related to mining operations, causing a 60% surge in the overall
bandwidth consumption. The investigation found no attempts
of manipulating the controller configuration or sending com-
mands.
4.12.2. Response and lessons learned
The security firm informed the water utility about the crypto-
mining malware and infected servers. The recovery scheme in-
cluded updating the anti-virus software on some servers as well
as tightening the firewall security. The updated anti-virus soft-
ware was successful in detecting the CoinMiner malware.
This incident is believed to be the first known instance of
cryptojacking—i.e., the unauthorized use of a computing re-
source to illicitly mine cryptocurrency—being used against an
ICS. Suspicious network traffic was the clue that led to the de-
tection of the cryptojacking in this incident. Besides suspicious
network traffic, high processor usage, sluggish response times,
and overheating are some symptoms of cryptojacking that can
be monitored for early detection. [The sources used herein for
this incident included Radiflow, Newman (2018), and Kerner
(2018).]
4.13. Onslow Water and Sewer Authority, U.S., 2018
4.13.1. Incident
Onslow Water and Sewer Authority, a water utility com-
pany in Jacksonville (North Carolina) was targeted by cyber-
criminals in October of 2018. Timed right in the wake of Hur-
ricane Florence, the attack soon escalated into a sophisticated
ransomware attack that locked out employees and encrypted
databases, leaving the utility with limited computing capabil-
ities. The hack began with persistent cyber-attacks through a
virus known as EMOTET. With the EMOTET virus infection
persisting, the authority reached out to outside security experts
to investigate and respond to the attack. At approximately 3 am
on Saturday October 13th, while the investigations were still
underway, the malware launched a more sophisticated virus
known as RYUK. The IT team immediately disconnected the
authority’s facilities from the internet. Nevertheless, the situ-
ation soon exacerbated and the virus encrypted files and data.
The authority suspects that the attack has been a targeted one
because the hackers chose a target that was recently hit by a nat-
ural disaster. Moreover, the sophisticated virus was launched at
3 am on a Saturday—a time in which the authority was most
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vulnerable. The authority soon received one email from the cy-
ber criminals demanding payment to decrypt the damaged files
and data. The authority dismissed the offer and stated it will not
negotiate with criminals nor bow to their demands.
4.13.2. Response and lessons learned
The authority has been working with the FBI, the DHS, the
state of North Carolina, and multiple security firms for remedi-
ation and recovery. The authority also planned to rebuild its IT
systems from the ground up.
The authority had multiple layers of protection in place,
including firewalls and antivirus/malware software, when the
hackers struck. Yet, their IT system proven to be penetrable.
Ransomware is the fastest growing malware threat, targeting
users of all types, according to the FBI. In this incident, the
utility decided not to pay a ransom. This is in accordance with
the federal guidelines—the US Government does not encourage
paying a ransom to criminal actors. [The sources used herein
for this incident included ONWASA and Mahairas (2018).]
4.14. Fort Collins Loveland Water District, U.S., 2019
4.14.1. Incident
Fort Collins Loveland Water District serves customers in
parts of Fort Collins, Loveland, Timnath, Windsor, and Larimer
County (Colorado). On February 11th, 2019, the staff of the Fort
Collins Loveland Water District and South Fort Collins Sanita-
tion District were unable to access technical data. Daily op-
erations and customers’ data were not believed to have been
compromised. The utility had fallen victim to a ransomware
cyber-attack. The hackers demanded a ransom to restore access
(the amount of ransom payment demanded has not been dis-
closed to the public). The district declined to pay the ransom.
4.14.2. Response and lessons learned
Within a few weeks, the district managed to unlock the data
on its own. The decision on whether or not to notify the cus-
tomers about the hack was also a challenge. Eventually, it was
decided not to notify them, since the district did not store cus-
tomers’ data. All payments were indeed handled by a third-
party vendor.
This is another case of ransomware attack in which the victim
declined to pay a ransom. Data segmentation and segregation
proven to be a helpful practice in safeguarding sensitive cus-
tomer and daily operation data. Hiring a third-party vendor to
handle customer payments prevented the customer data to be
compromised. The practice of hiring third-party vendors, how-
ever, creates its own risks, as it was also manifested by Incident
11. [The sources used herein for this incident included Ferrier
(2019) and Sobczak (2019).]
4.15. Riviera Beach Water Utility, U.S., 2019
4.15.1. Incident
On May 29th, 2019, Riviera Beach, a small city of 35,000
inhabitants located north of West Palm Beach (Florida), was hit
by a crippling ransomware attack after an employee of the po-
lice department opened an infected email. Paralyzing computer
systems of the police department, city council and other local
government offices, the ransomware sent all operations offline
and encrypted their data. The attack also spread to the water
utility, compromising the computer systems controlling pump-
ing stations and water quality testing, as well as its payment
operations.
4.15.2. Response and lessons learned
A few days after the attack, the city council unanimously
voted to authorize its insurer to pay 65 bitcoins, approximately
$600,000, to the attackers. The city would pay an additional
$25,000 as insurance deductibles out of its budget. Two weeks
after the attack was disclosed, the IT department could bring
the city’s website and email services fully operational, while
the water pump stations and water quality testing systems were
only partially available. Although water quality sampling had
to be performed manually, the city councils spokeswoman as-
sured that water quality itself was never in jeopardy. The FBI,
Secret Service, and DHS investigated the attack and recom-
mended the city not to pay the ransom. Regardless of paying
the ransom, as of June 20th, 2019, the sensitive data being en-
crypted by hackers were still inaccessible.
While waiting for the attackers to share a decryption key, the
local government authorized spending more than $900,000 to
buy new computer hardware—purchases which were planned
for next year. According to a councilperson, most of the exist-
ing hardware was old and outdated, which made it vulnerable
to the cyber-attack. In addition, the citys computer network was
not updated, and patches were not installed on time.
It is known that local governments and small public utilities
are less prepared for cyber-attacks, since they lack the budget
and professionals needed to secure their IT and OT systems.
That said, basic cybersecurity training raises awareness, and re-
duces the possibility of succumbing to devastating attacks un-
leashed by the naivety of uninformed employees, such as the
case for Riviera Beach. Although paying a ransom looks like
the easiest way to solve the problem, FBI and security experts
suggest never to pay ransom as it only encourages future crimi-
nal activity. Preventing cyber-attacks from happening is always
the best practice. [The sources used herein for this incident in-
cluded Doris (2019), Mazzei (2019), and O’Donnell (2019).]
5. Discussion
As outlined in the previous section, the complexity of cyber-
incidents in WWS has increased during the last two decades.
In some earlier incidents, such as the 2000 Maroochy Water
Services hack, an insider simply and directly gained access to
the OT controllers and performed malicious activities, while in
some recent attacks, such the 2016 Kemuri Water Company
hack, several IT and OT workstations were compromised by
outsiders using multi-step attack techniques. In this section, we
review and analyze some key points of the aforementioned in-
cidents from both attacker and defender’s perspectives.
Table 2 provides an overview of the time, location, targeted
systems type, the investigation teams (i.e., target organization,
third-party security teams, or governmental agencies), and the
impacts associated with each incident. The majority of targeted
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systems are US-based water systems, which might be because:
1) they use more advanced networking technologies (integrated
IT/OT architecture) and are thus more exposed to the internet;
2) they are lucrative targets for hackers with a wide variety
of goals; and 3) incidents reporting and information sharing
is more systematically and extensively encouraged, required,
and pursued in the US (NIST). There have been claims of
WWS cyber-attacks in other countries, such as Ukraine (Mar-
tin, 2018), but limited reliable, information is publicly available
for such incidents. The WWS systems targeted by the cyber-
criminals have been very diverse, ranging from upstream water
supply systems to downstream wastewater treatment plants, un-
derlining the fact that all types of water systems are susceptible
to cyber-attacks. Table 2 also indicates that the consequences
of the cyber-attacks have been extremely diverse. The attacks
have led to the pollution of open water bodies, theft of irriga-
tion water, data breach, and manipulation of chemicals rates in
potable water, to name a few. No reports of human casualties
was found by this study. It is also observed that the primary
incident investigators rarely come from victim’s organization.
This might indicate a shortage of in-house security teams or
trained personnel.
Attackers are usually grouped based on their capabilities,
motivations, and goals. Based on these characteristics, various
groups of attackers are defined such as script kiddies (curious,
unskilled individual), cyberterrorists (physical damage goals),
cybercriminals (financial goals), hacktivists (social or political
goals), and state-sponsored actors. It is worth mentioning that
some other groups, such as cyber researchers, white/black hats
and internal actors, have been also proposed in the literature
(Ablon, 2018). Regardless of their goals and capabilities, at-
tackers can be insider or outsider. Table 3 summarizes the type
of attackers, their target assets and domains, and their final ac-
tion on the observed target. Attacker and group for Incident
4 are not available simply because the incident was later con-
firmed to be a false alarm. It is observed that insiders are com-
mon adversaries in the water sector, as reported for the Key
Largo Wastewater Treatment District, Maroochy Shire, Tehama
Colusa Canal Authority, the five Eastern water utilities attacks,
and a regional water supplier hack (Incidents 1, 3, 5, 7, and 11).
This suggests that management and security teams should be
more cognizant of changes in the behaviors of employees. For
example, in the Maroochy Water attack, the attacker was no
longer an employee. However, he still had access to the wire-
less network. Thus, he can be considered as an insider caus-
ing physical and financial damages (both cyber-criminal and
cyber-terrorist) who changed the configuration of several OT
controllers. In some similar examples, such as Incidents 3, 5,
and 7, former employees or contractors tried to cause harm (fi-
nancially or physically) through an unauthorized access to the
IT or OT systems. In case of Incident 7, the attacker chose
multiple targets in different domains of five utilities.
The attacker in the second incident was most likely a script
kiddie (SK) outsider, who installed malware on the victim’s
computer to gain access to the internal information and dis-
tribute emails and information—there is no evidence of other
groups of attackers in the public report. However, it is known
that Attack 8 is performed by state-sponsored parties who tar-
geted multiple IT and OT systems that resulted in the data exfil-
tration and manipulation of chemicals and flow rates. Incident
4 is known as a false alarm; however, several operational issues
were observed at the same time, thereby confusing the investi-
gation team. As shown in Table 3, recent incidents (since 2017)
appear to have a more complex nature. The attackers, insider
or outsider, have been targeting databases, files, and account
servers of the victims for financial purposes. As organizations
advance and integrate their IT and OT systems and limit the
OT systems from accessing to internet directly, the IT systems
become of more interest for attackers and the entry point to
the victim’s network. The most interesting and unusual attack
in this study is perhaps Incident 12, where attackers deployed
a cryptocurrency mining code on the OT network of the target
utility (most likely downloaded from malicious websites) to use
the computational resources of OT machines as part of a mining
pool that creates or discovers digital currency.
There is no single defense mechanism that can protect WWS
against cyber threats, so the defense teams should use any
mechanism (e.g., detect, deny, deceive) offered by critical secu-
rity controls (CSC) (CIS) (see Table 1). In Table 4, we outline
the most needed protection mechanisms and top-three basic and
foundational CSC for the attacks described in this study. The
foundational CSC are associated to specific architectural levels,
based on the attacker’s first step and weakest point of the vic-
tim’s network. We note that in almost all incidents there exists
a lack of organizational controls, such as “Security Skills As-
sessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps” or “Incident
Response and Management.” Although many organizations use
proactive approaches—such as routine vulnerability and threat
assessment or adversary simulation (red teaming - CSC 20)—to
find security flaws in their network, most of the reviewed inci-
dents were not detected proactively. Reactive security strategy,
as seen in most industrial networks triggers, is “respond when
it happens.” Table 4 also shows that most of WWS networks
suffer from a lack of preventive security mechanisms (column
Deny in Figure 3), that is, the first line of defense in cybersecu-
rity practice.
6. Epilogue
This study presented a review of 15 cybersecurity incidents
in the water and wastewater sector within the context of indus-
trial network architectures and attack-defense models. The in-
cidents covered a wide variety of vulnerabilities and situations.
The incidents spanned over 18 years, from the Maroochy Shire
Sewage Treatment Plant insider attack in 2000 to the Riviera
Beach Water Utility ransomware attack in 2019. This review is
an informative resource to guide securing of industrial control
systems in WWS and other lifeline sectors against cyberthreats.
The sheer diversity of the systems, attackers, and consequences
associated with the incidents dictate a need for inclusive and
comprehensive vulnerability assessments, as well as risk mit-
igation, preparedness, response, and recovery studies that ac-
count for such extreme heterogeneity.
Because the reports by official agencies indicated a large
number of cybersecurity incidents in the WWS, this review may
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Table 2: Summary of the incidents.
# Location Year Target System Investigator Primary Impact
1 Australia 2000 Wastewater HWT & Queensland EPA Environmental pollution
2 PA, U.S. 2006 Water treatment FBI Data breach
3 CA, U.S. 2007 Irrigation System personnel Water theft
4 IL, U.S. 2011 Water plant DHS Cry-wolf effects
5 FL, U.S. 2012 Wastewater System personnel Data breach
6 NY, U.S. 2013 Dam Justice Department Data breach
7 U.S. 2013 Water utility Third-party provider Data manipulation
8 U.S. 2016 Water utility Verizon Security Control manipulation
9 U.S. 2016 Water utility DHS Data breach
10 U.S. 2016 Water utility DHS Bandwidth theft
11 U.K. 2017 Water supplier Verizon Security Financial impact
12 Europe 2018 Water utility Radiflow Resource theft
13 NC, U.S. 2018 Water utility State and Federal Data loss
14 CO, U.S. 2019 Water district System personnel Denial of access
15 FL, U.S. 2019 Water utility FBI, DHS and Secret Services Data loss
Table 3: Adversary Analysis.
# Attacker Group Target Domain Action
1 Insider C&T RTU/PLC OT Configuration Change
2 Outsider SK Workstations IT Data Exfiltration
3 Insider C&T SCADA OT Software Installation
4 N/A N/A SCADA OT Physical process issue
5 Insider Cybercriminal Mail/File Server IT Data Exfiltration
6 Outsider State-sponsored SCADA/HMI OT Data Exfiltration
7 Insider Cybercriminal Multiple IT and OT Unauthorized Changes
8 Outsider State-sponsored Multiple IT and OT Multiple
9 Unknown Unknown SCADA OT Data Exfiltration
10 Unknown SK Routers OT Unauthorized access
11 Insider Cybercriminal Account DB IT Unauthorized access
12 Outsider Cybercriminal SCADA/HMI OT Cryptojacking
13 Outsider Cybercriminal Info. System IT Ransomware
14 Outsider Cybercriminal Databases IT and OT Ransomware
15 Outsider Cybercriminal Databases, SCADA IT and OT Ransomware
Table 4: Defense Analysis.
# Approach Protection Basic CSC Foundational CSC Architectural Level
1 Reactive Deny 1, 3, 5 12, 15, 16 1-2
2 Reactive Deny 2, 3, 4 7, 8, 14 2 and 4
3 Reactive Deny 2, 3, 5 11, 14, 16 2-3
4 Reactive Detect 2, 5, 6 9, 11, 12 2-3
5 Proactive Deny 3, 5, 6 7, 13, 16 5 (or DMZ)
6 Unknown Deny 2, 4, 6 9, 11,12 2-3
7 Reactive Deny 1, 3, 5 14, 15, 16 2-4
8 Proactive Detect 1, 3, 4 9, 11, 14 2-5
9 Reactive Disrupt 2, 3, 4 8, 9, 13 2-3
10 Reactive Deny 3, 4, 5 11, 14, 15 3-5
11 Reactive Degrade 4, 5, 6 12, 13, 14 4-5
12 Proactive Deny 2, 3, 4 7, 8, 11 2-3
13 Reactive Contain 2, 3, 4 8, 10, 13 4-5
14 Reactive Contain 2, 3, 4 8, 10, 13 3-5
15 Reactive Contain 2, 3, 4 7, 8, 10 3-5
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not be inclusive of all incidents. Many of them may not be made
public. The framework developed by this study, however, was
structured and designed so that it can readily accommodate ex-
tensions and updates as more incidents are possibly disclosed
(or take place in the future). The development and maintenance
of an online version of this repository is believed to be a signif-
icant future endeavor to pursue.
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